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MCCUTCHEON V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
Supreme Court Holds Aggregate Limits on Campaign 
Contributions Unconstitutional  
 
Stephen M. DeGenaro* 
INTRODUCTION 
Campaign finance law “is a matter of First Amendment concern.”1  
Political speech has long enjoyed coveted status as a category of speech 
most fundamental to the U.S. system of governance, thus warranting robust 
protection.2  A person choosing to spend money in connection with a 
candidate or ballot initiative implicates protections of the First Amendment 
because such actions are a form of both political expression and 
 
 ©  2014 Stephen M. DeGenaro.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce 
and distribute copies of this Recent Case in any format at or below cost, for educational 
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame 
Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
 *  Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2014; Bachelor of Arts, 
Georgetown University, Class of 2011. I would like to thank Professor Randy J. Kozel for 
providing invaluable background knowledge and assistance on a paper from which this Case 
Comment developed.  I would also like to thank the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for 
their top-notch editing in preparing this Case Comment for publication.  All errors are my 
own. 
 1  Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 2  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may 
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, 
an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); id. at 270 (discussing the fact that the First Amendment reflects a 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”). 
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association.3  Campaign finance regulation is demarcated based upon the 
form that the political expression or association takes.4  Restrictions on 
expenditures—money spent by the donor or speaker to express support for 
the candidate or issue—fail to satisfy strict scrutiny.5  Restrictions on 
contributions—money given by the donor or speaker directly to the 
candidate or issue—will be upheld by a court when “the State demonstrates 
a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”6  For purposes of 
establishing a sufficiently important interest, the government may seek to 
eliminate actual or apparent corruption in politics, but may neither seek to 
eliminate the amount of money spent in elections nor increase the influence 
of groups.7 
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission involved a challenge to 
limits imposed on the amount a donor may contribute during a single 
election cycle.8  In McCutcheon, the Court was presented with the question 
of whether the aggregate limits placed on contributions to candidate and 
 
 3  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam).  Expressional freedoms 
under the First Amendment are so robust as to extend equal protection to unpopular as well 
as popular speech.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) 
(declaring unconstitutional a federal law criminalizing the act of lying about receipt of 
military decorations); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam) 
(striking down a state statute that criminalized mere advocacy for violence to affect political 
change, rather than “incitement to lawless action,” thereby upholding the right of members 
of the KKK to hold a rally where the rally falls short of “incitement”).  The Supreme Court 
has recognized associational freedoms within the realm of political speech both generally, 
see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is beyond debate 
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”), and specifically, see Kusper v. 
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973) (“There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to 
associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 
orderly group activity protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 4  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–13. 
 5  Id. at 58–59; see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 
(1989) (“The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected 
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to 
further the articulated interest.”). 
 6  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
 7  See Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 
2825–27 (2011). 
 8  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).  The Federal Election Commission is 
an independent administrative agency tasked with administering and enforcing the laws that 
govern federal elections.  See About the FEC, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2014).  For a general discussion about the binding nature of various 
administrative agency actions, see Stephen M. DeGenaro, Note, Why Should We Care About 
An Agency’s Special Insight?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909 (2013). 
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noncandidate committees either lacked a cognizable constitutional interest 
or were unconstitutionally too low.9  In a five to four decision, the Supreme 
Court held that the aggregate limits on campaign contributions burden 
substantial First Amendment rights without furthering a permissible 
government interest.10 
I.     HISTORY 
The Federal Election Commission Act (FECA), as amended by the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),11 has two different types of 
contribution limitations.12  Base limits restrict the amount of money a donor 
may contribute to any single candidate or committee.13  Aggregate limits 
restrict the amount of money a donor may contribute to all candidates or 
committees during a single election cycle.14  Any single contribution may 
violate the base limits, aggregate limits, or both, depending on how much 
money the donor has already contributed during an election cycle.  For 
example, during the 2013–2014 election cycle, FECA’s base limits 
permitted an individual to contribute up to $2600 per election to any 
particular candidate, while FECA’s aggregate limits permitted 
contributions up to $48,600 to federal candidates.15  A donor attempting to 
give $3000 to a congressional candidate after having already contributed 
$48,000 to other federal candidates would violate both the base and 
aggregate limits.  If the donor instead chose to limit his contribution to the 
$2600 amount permitted under the base limits, the donor would still violate 
the aggregate limits because the contributions exceed the $48,600 limit.  
This would be true even for smaller contributions, because any amount 
donated to the candidate over $600 would exceed the aggregate limits for 
the 2013–2014 election cycle. 
Shawn McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who sought to make a 
series of contributions to various federal candidates for office during the 
2011–2012 election cycle.  In total, McCutcheon lawfully contributed 
$33,088 to sixteen different federal candidates and $27,328 to numerous 
noncandidate political committees.16  McCutcheon wished to contribute 
$1776 to twelve additional candidates, but FECA’s aggregate limits 
 
 9  McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 10  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462. 
 11  52 U.S.C.A. § 30101 (West 2014).   
 12  See id. §§ 30116(a)(1), 30116(a)(3).   
 13  § 30116(a)(1). 
 14  § 30116(a)(3). 
 15  Senate General Election Expenditure Limits for the 2013–2014 Election Cycle, 78 
Fed. Reg. 8532 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
 16  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1443 (2014). 
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prevented him from doing so.17  McCutcheon, along with the Republican 
National Committee (RNC), brought a First Amendment challenge in 
federal court in 2012, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the 
aggregate limits.18  McCutcheon and the RNC argued that the challenged 
aggregate limits were “unsupported by any cognizable government 
interest . . . at any level of review” and were unconstitutionally low.19 
A three-judge district court panel denied McCutcheon and the RNC’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Federal Election 
Commission’s motion to dismiss.20  The district court rejected 
McCutcheon’s argument that strict scrutiny ought to be applied to the 
aggregate limitations based on First Amendment precedent.21  The district 
court found that the government’s sufficiently important interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is furthered by limits 
that prevent the circumvention of contribution limits.  The district court 
first observed that the government’s interest in preventing corruption was 
limited to quid pro quo corruption—direct contributions to political 
candidates in exchange for political favors22—and that mere influence or 
access to a candidate or officeholder did not rise to the level of 
corruption.23  To that end, however, the district court found that the 
aggregate limits helped prevent the evasion of the base limits—the latter of 
which unquestionably implicate the government’s anticorruption interest.24  
In support of this conclusion, the district court mentioned that, without the 
aggregate limits, a donor would be able to: 
give half-a-million dollars in a single check to a joint fundraising 
committee comprising a party’s presidential candidate, the party’s 
national party committee, and most of the party’s state party 
 
 17  Id.  During the 2013–2014 election cycle, McCutcheon told the Court “he again 
wishe[d]t to contribute at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to noncandidate 
political committees.”  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20  Id. at 142. 
 21  Id. at 138. 
 22  Id. at 139 (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for 
political favors.” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 
497 (1985)). 
 23  Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).  In Citizens United, 
the Supreme Court explained that influence or access to a candidate is not corruption 
without more because “[i]t is well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not 
the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another 
is that the candidate will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter 
favors.  Democracy is premised on responsiveness.” 558 U.S. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)). 
 24  McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
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committees.  After the fundraiser, the committees are required to divvy 
the contributions to ensure that no committee receives more than its 
permitted share, but because party committees may transfer unlimited 
amounts of money to other party committees of the same party, the half-
a-million-dollar contribution might nevertheless find its way to a single 
committee’s coffers.  That committee, in turn, might use the money for 
coordinated expenditures, which have no significant functional 
difference from the party’s direct candidate contributions.  The 
candidate who knows the coordinated expenditure funding derives from 
that single large check at the joint fundraising event will know precisely 
where to lay the wreath of gratitude.25 
Moreover, the district court rejected McCutcheon’s argument that the 
limits were not closely drawn to furthering the anticircumvention interest.26  
McCutcheon argued that the limits were unconstitutionally low because, 
for example, if he had wanted to support a candidate in all 468 federal races 
in 2006, the aggregate limits then in effect would have restricted 
McCutcheon’s contributions to $85.29 per candidate—an amount far below 
a limit held unconstitutionally low in Randall v. Sorrell.27  The district 
court found this argument unpersuasive because, even conceding the fact 
that McCutcheon would be so limited, he “remain[ed] able to volunteer, 
join political associations, and engage in independent expenditures” as 
means of expressing his political beliefs.28 
Following the district court’s decision, McCutcheon and the RNC 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.29 
II.     ANALYSIS 
Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment in McCutcheon in an 
opinion joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.30  The Supreme 
Court first rejected the invitation to revisit Buckley because of its limited 
utility in analyzing the constitutionality of FECA’s aggregate limits.31  
Buckley itself only dedicated three sentences to aggregate limits because 
 
 25  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Although the Court 
acknowledged that gratitude is not itself corruption, the parties involved could implicitly 
agree to the above hypothetical as a means of masking quid pro quo corruption.  Id. 
 26  Id. at 141. 
 27  Id. at 141 n.5 (citing Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 239 (2006)). 
 28  Id. at 142. 
 29  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014); 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012) 
(“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an 
order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction 
in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and 
determined by a district court of three judges.”). 
 30  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1436. 
 31  Id. at 1445. 
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they “ha[d] not been separately addressed at length by the parties.”32  In 
contrast, the McCutcheon Court had been directly confronted with the 
constitutionality of aggregate limits.33  The Court noted that subsequent 
legislative developments since Buckley warranted full review of the 
aggregate limits’ constitutionality.34  Base limits on contributions made to 
political committees were enacted in 1976 “in part to prevent 
circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this Court 
upheld in Buckley.”35  As further evidence of subsequent legislative 
developments, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “[t]he 1976 Amendments 
also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or 
controlling multiple affiliated political committees[]”36 that could be used 
to “direct funds in excess of the individual base limits.”37  The Federal 
Election Commission has also enacted earmarking regulations that prevent 
a donor from making contributions to political committees supporting a 
candidate for whom the donor has reached the base contribution limits “if 
the individual knows that ‘a substantial portion [of his contribution] will be 
contributed to, or expended on behalf of,’ that candidate.”38  Finally, the 
Court noted that Buckley did not involve an overbreadth challenge to the 
aggregate limits.39  Each of these considerations led the Court to conclude 
that Buckley should not control the outcome of this case.40 
The Court, however, disagreed with Buckley that aggregate limits only 
pose a “quite modest restraint” on political speech.41  At the current 
aggregate limits, a donor could not support ten candidates up to the full 
amount permitted under the base limits; moreover, after the donor reached 
the aggregate limit, he or she was prevented from further supporting 
additional candidates through contributions of even one dollar.42  The 
aggregate limits thus worked substantial harm upon a would-be speaker 
from engaging in protected First Amendment activity well within the base 
 
 32  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976)) (alteration in original). 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 1446. 
 35  Id. (quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 197–198 (1981) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. at 1447.  
 38  Id. (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(h)(2) (2014)) (alteration in original). 
 39  Id.  The doctrine of overbreadth states generally that if the statute under which the 
speaker is prosecuted “sweeps in” too much protected speech that should not be covered, 
then the statute is unconstitutional.  Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 530–31 (1972).  The 
concern motivating the doctrine is that “persons whose expression is constitutionally 
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions 
provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”  Id. at 521. 
 40  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 41  Id. at 1448 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976)). 
 42  Id. 
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limits Congress found to prevent corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.43 
Moreover, the Court found unpersuasive the government’s arguments 
that the aggregate limits furthered its interest in preventing corruption.44  
The aggregate limits did not further the goal of preventing corruption per se 
because once a donor reached the limits, the law prevented him from 
contributing even one additional dollar.45  This, the Court stated, is contrary 
to Congress’s conclusion that all contributions at or below the base limit do 
not pose a “cognizable risk of corruption.”46  The government was also 
unable to justify the aggregate limit as necessary for preventing 
circumvention of the base limits.47  Post-Buckley campaign finance 
legislation prohibited each hypothetical scenario involving a donor 
circumventing the base limits.48  For instance, earmarking and 
antiproliferation laws prevent the hypothetical donor channeling donations 
to a candidate through various political action committees (PACs).49  
Attempts to donate to unaffiliated PACs would dilute the corrupting 
influence of the donation because the donor’s contribution would be pooled 
with other contributions and often times dispersed to candidates other than 
the intended target.50  Furthermore, it is unlikely that a donor would make a 
large number of contributions to different PACs in order to funnel a small 
amount of money to one candidate when the donor is free to make an 
unlimited amount of expenditures on behalf of the same candidate without 
worrying the money would go to some other recipient.51 
 
 43  Id.  The Court said that “[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can simply 
contribute less money to more people” to avoid the constitutional problem posed by the 
aggregate limits because “[t]o require one person to contribute at lower levels than others 
because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on 
broader participation in the democratic process.”  Id. at 1449. 
 44  Id. at 1450.  The Court also reaffirmed the principle that the government may only 
permissively regulate actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption: “As Buckley explained, 
Congress may permissibly seek to rein in ‘large contributions [that] are given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.’”  Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 26 (alteration in original)).  In contrast, “[s]pending large sums of money in 
connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption.”  Id. 
 45  Id. at 1452. 
 46  Id.  
 47  Id. at 1453. 
 48  Id. at 1452–53. 
 49  Id. at 1453; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 50  Id. at 1453. 
 51  Id. at 1454 (“On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational actor would 
engage in such machinations. . . . [A] dedicated donor spent $500,000 . . . to add just 
$26,000 to [a hypothetical candidate] Smith’s campaign coffers.  That same donor . . . could 
have spent his entire $500,000 advocating for Smith, without the risk that his selected PACs 
would choose not to give to Smith . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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The Court also found that the government failed to show proper fit 
between the aggregate limits and the furthered interest.52  The aggregate 
limits would only work as an anticircumvention measure if it could be 
shown that large amounts were being made and then subsequently 
recontributed to the actual intended recipient; yet, the Court found that 
experience suggests “recipients have scant interest in regifting donations 
they receive.”53  In any event, Congress had a choice of many alternative 
means to further the anticircumvention interest without “‘unnecessary 
abridgment’ of First Amendment rights.”54  For instance, Congress could 
have increased restrictions on transfers among candidates and PACs55 or 
strengthened earmarking regulations.56  Finally, the Court noted that 
disclosure requirements “deter actual corruption”57 and “arm[] the voting 
public with information”58 without imposing a “ceiling on speech” in the 
same way that aggregate limits do.59 
Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote to declare the aggregate limits 
unconstitutional, but wrote separately to voice his belief that Buckley 
should be overruled.60  Justice Thomas found the bifurcation between 
political expenditures and contributions “tenuous” because both “‘generate 
essential political speech’ by fostering discussion of public issues and 
candidate qualifications.”61  For instance, Buckley’s rationale for allowing 
restrictions on contributions—that contributions only serve to generally 
express support without communicating the underlying basis of the 
 
 52  Id. at 1456. 
 53  Id. at 1457.  As an example, the Court observed that “the NRSC [National 
Republican Senatorial Committee] and DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Committee] spent just 7% of their total funds on contributions to candidates and the NRCC 
[National Republican Congressional Committee] and DCCC [Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee] spent just 3%.”  Id. 
 54  Id. at 1458 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). 
 55  Id. at 1458–59.  “One possible option for restricting transfers would be to require 
contributions above the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated, 
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients.”  Id. at 1458. 
 56  Id. at 1459 (“Congress might also consider a modified version of the aggregate 
limits, such as one that prohibits donors who have contributed the current maximum sums 
from further contributing to political committees that have indicated they will support 
candidates to whom the donor has already contributed.”). 
 57  Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67).  
 58  Id. at 1460. 
 59  Id. at 1459. 
 60  Id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I adhere to the view that this Court’s 
decision in Buckley v. Valeo denigrates core First Amendment speech and should be 
overruled.” (citation omitted)). 
 61  Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting)). 
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support62—cannot be squared with the fact that the Supreme Court “has 
never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his position in order to 
obtain full First Amendment protection.”63  Justice Thomas also found 
unpersuasive the argument that “[t]he quantity of communication by the 
contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his 
contribution,”64 because contributions assist a candidate to increase the 
dissemination of his or her message.65  Finally, Justice Thomas said that the 
plurality opinion itself rejected the last remaining rationale for allowing 
restrictions on contributions: contribution restrictions leave open alternative 
channels for expression.66  In light of the plurality’s rejection of the last 
remaining rationale for restricting contributions, Justice Thomas concluded 
“Buckley is a rule without a rationale.”67 
Justice Breyer penned a dissenting opinion, which Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.68  The dissent argued that the plurality 
opinion defined corruption “too narrowly” because the plurality ignored the 
important First Amendment interests that the government has in regulating 
money in politics.69  In the eyes of the dissent, “the First Amendment 
advances not only the individual’s right to engage in political speech, but 
also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which 
collective speech matters.”70  Corruption, then, is any action that “derails 
the essential speech-to-government-action tie” between the general public 
will and its representatives, not the “limited definition of ‘corruption’” that 
involves direct exchange of money for political favors.71  By safeguarding 
the electoral process, campaign finance law ensures that the government 
remains responsive to the larger public, rather than a select few 
individuals.72 
According to the dissent, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence confirms 
this broader understanding of corruption.73  For example, the Supreme 
Court upheld a ban on direct contributions by corporations in Federal 
Election Commission v. Beaumont as a means of preventing individuals 
who own or work at a corporation from using the corporate form to 
 
 62  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 2. 
 63  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1463. 
 64  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 65  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1463. 
 66  Id. at 1464; see supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 69  Id. at 1466. 
 70  Id. at 1467 (emphasis omitted). 
 71  Id. at 1468; accord id. at 1467. 
 72  Id. at 1468. 
 73  See id. 
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circumvent individual base contribution limits.74  Beaumont characterized 
the government’s interest as preventing “not only . . . quid pro quo 
agreements, but also . . . undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.”75  
Similarly, “undue influence” was considered an acceptable government 
interest in limiting coordinated campaign expenditures among candidates 
and political parties,76 state law contribution limits,77 and soft money 
contributions.78  Thus, to the dissent, the plurality wrongly goes further 
down the path that Citizens United started when it confines its definition of 
corruption to actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.79 
The dissent also took issue with the plurality’s contention that 
aggregate limits were no longer needed to further an anticircumvention 
interest.80  To demonstrate the necessity of the limits, Justice Breyer listed 
three hypotheticals, which he argued reflected gaps in campaign finance 
law that can only be closed by aggregate limits.81  In the first, a donor 
legally contributes $1.2 million to a Joint Party Committee soliciting funds 
for all federal and state political committees where the donor would 
otherwise be capped at contributing $74,600.82  In the second, a donor 
legally contributes a total of $3.6 million to all of a party’s candidates for 
the House or Senate during a single election cycle, with the understanding 
that over $2.3 million of that total could be funneled to a single candidate.83  
In the third, party members could create 200 PACs, which would then in 
turn solicit $10,000 donations each from a single donor and contribute it to 
a single candidate.84  Each hypothetical created the opportunity for the 
donor to curry strong favor with the party of his or her choice and, 
according to the dissent, invited the chance of quid pro quo favors from the 
appreciative recipients that other existing checks could not guard against.85 
 
 74  See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155–56 (2003). 
 75  Id. at 156 (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 
441 (2001)) (citation omitted). 
 76  Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441. 
 77  Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388–89 (2000). 
 78  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010).  “Soft money” is a term used to describe funds that went to political 
parties for purposes other than directly helping a candidate; such activities include “voter 
registration, ‘get out the vote’ drives, and advertising that d[oes] not expressly advocate a 
federal candidate’s election or defeat.”  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1469 (citing McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 122–24). 
 79  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1470–71. 
 80  Id. at 1471–72. 
 81  Id. at 1472–75. 
 82  Id. at 1472; accord id. 1472–73. 
 83  Id. at 1473–74. 
 84  Id. at 1474–75. 
 85  Id. at 1475–78. 
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Finally, the dissent criticized the portion of the plurality that pertained 
to the fit of the aggregate limits.86  While the plurality suggested that the 
government could take any number of different steps other than aggregate 
limits to further its anticircumvention interest without restricting as much 
protected speech, the dissent observes that the plurality could not show 
how each alternative “could effectively replace aggregate contribution 
limits.”87  Moreover, each alternative had been “similarly available at the 
time of Buckley” when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
aggregate limits in 1976, and yet the plurality made no attempt to 
demonstrate how the same limits had become “poorly tailored” in 
McCutcheon.88 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of McCutcheon, proponents of campaign finance reform 
have decried McCutcheon as the latest example of the Supreme Court 
rolling back necessary restrictions on campaign spending and gradually 
chipping away at Buckley v. Valeo.89  This latter concern seems unlikely at 
this juncture for two reasons. 
First, McCutcheon is not as hostile towards Buckley as some initially 
feared.  Justice Thomas appears to be the only member of the Supreme 
Court ready to overturn Buckley; the four justices in dissent certainly would 
uphold a constitutional challenge to base contribution limits, and the 
plurality is still willing to accept that base contributions do in fact serve as 
a necessary measure for preventing actual or apparent corruption.  In fact, 
the plurality opinion assumed the constitutionality of the base contributions 
in order to highlight throughout its opinion the problems with aggregate 
limits.90  McCutcheon also never stated the applicable scrutiny to be 
applied to aggregate contributions because the plurality found that the 
 
 86  Id. at 1479. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id. 
 89  See, e.g., David Schultz, Amend the Constitution to Restore the Democracy the 
Roberts Court Killed, THE HILL (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:01 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/216168-amend-the-constitution-to-
restore-the-democracy-the (“The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roberts continued to 
hack away at efforts such as McCain-Feingold to limit the power of money in 
politics.  Citizens United and McCutcheon are only the most recent examples of how the 
Court is letting money and privilege entrench itself, preventing the political system from 
functioning.”). 
 90  E.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448  (plurality opinion) (“To put it in the simplest 
terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and 
general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within 
the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption.”); id. at 1452 
(noting that “Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 
contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption.”). 
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aggregate limits could not even satisfy the lower, “closely drawn” standard 
applied to contribution limits.91  Significantly, McCutcheon did not 
explicitly state, nor implicitly suggest, that base contributions ought to be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny—which would make it more challenging for 
the government to justify restrictions on base contributions.  McCutcheon 
still leaves room for the government to utilize base contributions to combat 
actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.  Whatever effects McCutcheon 
may have on the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence going 
forward,92 providing the means to overrule Buckley does not appear to be 
one of them. 
Second, McCutcheon left undisturbed—indeed, it even spoke 
favorably of—components of campaign finance law pertaining to 
disclosure.93  This portion of the majority’s opinion is by no means an 
academic exercise.  It is true that, depending on one’s perspective, money 
is either the most powerful form of political speech or is an extraordinarily 
powerful tool for enabling effective political speech.94  Yet, money is not 
the be-all, end-all form of speech that critics of Citizens United suggest it 
is.  American politics is rife with examples of high-profile elections in 
which other, more cost-effective forms of speech trumped well-financed 
speech.95  To put it simply, “dollars do not vote.”96  Under a First 
 
 91  Id. at 1446 (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s 
stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the 
‘closely drawn’ test.  We therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards 
in this case.”). 
 92  It remains to be seen to what extent McCutcheon limits the ability of state laws that 
impose similar aggregate limits on campaign contributions.  Federal courts have imposed 
preliminary injunctions against enforcement of state aggregate limits in both Wisconsin and 
Minnesota.  See CRG Network v. Barland, No. 14-C-719, 2014 WL 4391193, at *1 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 5, 2014); Seaton v. Wiener, No. 14-1016 (DWF/JSM), 2014 WL 2081898, at *1 
(D. Minn. May 19, 2014).  It is likely that other state aggregate limits will be found 
similarly preempted by McCutcheon—including state courts following the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  For an examination of how state courts perform preemption analysis, see Stephen 
M. DeGenaro, Obstacle Preemption: Federal Purpose in State Courts, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y ONLINE (forthcoming 2015). 
 93  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1459–60 (“Disclosure requirements burden speech, 
but—unlike the aggregate limits—they do not impose a ceiling on speech.  For that reason, 
disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or 
quantities of speech.  With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective 
means of arming the voting public with information.” (citations omitted)). 
 94  EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 445 (4th ed. 
2011) (“Most effective speech—publishing a newspaper, buying a newspaper ad . . . 
printing and distributing leaflets, and the like—requires spending money. . . .  Restrictions 
on spending money to speak thus diminish people’s ability to speak effectively.”). 
 95  In the week leading up to the 2012 Presidential Election, Governor Romney’s 
campaign ran a targeted advertisement in Ohio related to the alleged closing of a Jeep plant 
in Ohio.  The Washington Post published an article shortly thereafter discrediting the 
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Amendment regime where the best ideas emerge when speech enjoys 
robust protection,97 being able to critically evaluate the message and its 
speaker will always provide a check against even the most pervasive and 
well-funded message.  As long as the First Amendment continues to uphold 
reasonable regulations requiring disclosure of campaign contributions, 
candidates and voters will be armed with facts they can argue show why 
they believe there is too much money in politics.  Nothing but their own 
desire to spread the message will limit the scope of their speech. 
This latter point is crucial.  If one imagines a counterfactual scenario 
in which McCutcheon upheld the aggregate limits, an unknown number of 
people would be prohibited from participating as fully in the political 
process as they otherwise might wish.  Moreover, although some people do 
not find large contributions to be a virtue of modern politics, others do, and 
they may wish to participate robustly in that manner.  So, in this respect, 
McCutcheon is more protective of political speech than the counterfactual 
scenario because all speakers can participate to the fullest extent they 
desire.  Rejecting aggregate limits ultimately affords greater protection to 
 
advertisement for deceptively portraying the facts surrounding the plant.  See Glenn Kessler, 
4 Pinocchios for Mitt Romney’s Misleading Ad on Chrysler and China, WASH. POST (Oct. 
30, 2012, 6:02 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/4-pinocchios-
for-mitt-romneys-misleading-ad-on-chrysler-and-china/2012/10/29/2a153a04-21d7-11e2-
ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html.  Although the author is not privy to specific numbers, it is 
far more likely that the Romney campaign spent more money on its media buy in the 
quintessential presidential election swing state than the total amount of money: (i) paid by 
the Washington Post for the salary of the staff to investigate and write the article, and (ii) 
time spent by numerous Ohio residents who read the article and shared it by email or social 
media.  As a resident of Ohio, the author can confirm that the Washington Post article fact-
checking the Romney ad was just as pervasive as the television buy made by the campaign.  
From a purely financial perspective, the speech associated with discrediting the Romney ad 
proved far more cost-effective than the ad itself—and given the fact that President Obama 
carried Ohio during the 2012 election, it may have been more effective from a tactical 
perspective for supporters of President Obama to share the Washington Post article. 
More recently, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor lost his seat to David Brat in 
Virginia’s Seventh District, despite outspending Brat by a ratio of more than 25 to 1.  See 
Jon Greenberg, Rare Feat: Cantor Spent more at Steakhouses than Opponent Did on 
Campaign, POLITIFACT (June 11, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jun/11/chuck-todd/rare-feat-cantor-
spent-more-steakhouses-opponent-d/.  Brat’s success is largely attributed to a strong 
message that portrayed Cantor as a Washington insider who did not spend enough time in 
his district.  See How Did Virginia Underdog David Brat Beat DC Political Player Eric 
Cantor?, FOX NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/11/how-
did-virginia-underdog-david-brat-beat-dc-political-player-eric-cantor/. 
 96  See How Did Virginia, supra note 96. 
 97  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and 
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
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citizens wishing to engage in collective self-governance—the very ideal the 
dissent seeks to protect through the imposition of aggregate limits.  When 
speech is afforded maximum protection, the processes of collective self-
governance, such as counter-speech and other forms of vigorous public 
debate, are safeguarded against government evaluation.  The People, not 
the judiciary, are then empowered to govern themselves by making 
evaluative decisions about the worth of any type of speech.98 
 
 
 98  STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 15 (2005) (“The concept of active liberty . . . refers to a sharing of a nation’s 
sovereign authority among its people.”). 
